



Institute of Social Policy and Research
RESEARCH FOR DEVELOPMENT

Friendship in Peril: Underlying Problems Facing South Sudan Foreign Policy with its Traditional Friends

Authors:

Malish John Peter

Merekaje Lorna

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ABSTRACT

The government of South Sudan should sign and implement a genuine and sustainable peace deal in action, spirit and words. This is the best scenario to lead the country out of the current crises. The TROIKA's concern for the continued civil war, violence and economic stagnation deserves to be acknowledged by the government as the starting point to restore their relationship. The events that unfolded since 2013 should not change South Sudan's friendship with the United States, United Kingdom and Norway. South Sudan has still a long way to establish itself in the community of nations and it will take technical, moral, diplomatic, military and financial support from these traditional allies to get itself up and running in politically unreliable region. Though, the TROIKA are justified in their displeasure with the government under the current political, economic and security crises, they still need to recommit their engagement and support the government technically, morally and financially in order to bring peace and stability to South Sudan. Moreover, funding humanitarian interventions should not be a matter of choice but a moral obligation to avert human catastrophe. United States proposed policy review towards the country should consider such realities.

INTRODUCTION

South Sudan's warring parties reconvened in Addis Ababa from 10-12 May 2018 in what the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) described as Intensive Interlinked Consultations (IIC) to reconsider their positions and compromise ahead of the final round of talks. Expectedly, this round of consultations ended without significant consensus on the sticking issues. As a result, the international community, particularly the traditional friends of South Sudan from the TROIKA countries (United States of America, United Kingdom and Norway) had stepped up their pressure on the government, armed oppositions and political parties to concede concessions for final political solution to the conflict. In strong worded statements, the TROIKA, the country's old friends and leading donors have increasingly become frustrated, dejected and worried of the ongoing stand-off at the peace talks while violence and confrontations persist in the peripheries of the country. Unsurprisingly, the parties' hardline positions are not new since the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed in 2015. Perhaps, the same hostility at the High-level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) and intentionally crafted scheme to frustrate the talks had been the reason that led to the frosty implementation of ARCSS in 2016 that resulted to renewed confrontations.

Nevertheless, the recent diplomatic spat between the government and its traditional partners should be a matter of concern to South Sudanese given the important role TROIKA played and will continue to perform in the country's future socio-economic and political development. In this policy brief, the Institute of Social Policy and Research critically examines what heightened the latest break-down in relationship between South Sudan government and the TROIKA. And further

discusses possible policy options for both sides to adopt in order to repair their relationship and rebuild new strategic alliance for peace and stability in South Sudan.

STAGGERING PEACE PROCESS

The first phase of the High-level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) an initiative by IGAD to revive the bedridden peace deal in December 2017 led to the signing of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities (ACoH). But this agreement did not stop the violence as parties continue to violate its terms with impunity. These violations including impediments of humanitarian access and reduced space for civil society and the media were major points of disagreement with TROIKA on the basic rights of citizens.

Similarly, the second phase of HLRF process concluded in February 16, 2018 without parties signing any deal. This can partly be blamed on IGAD's mediation style of not linking their shuttle diplomacy and actual round-table negotiations between parties. One could also argue, the conflict of interests by individual countries among the IGAD members and new players such as Egypt had to some extent undermined the HLRF process. In several occasions, IGAD had consulted stakeholders and generated some good reports but it remains unclear how precisely such reports had been used to redirect the negotiations. For example, the November 2017 Pre-HLRF Consultation Report which could have formed the basis of draft compromise deal for discussions has never been given any due attention. Instead at each round of talks the mediators chose to reopen the space for new submissions that basically allowed parties to file new conditions for negotiations. This approach has made the ongoing peace talks so much unpredictable to think it will yield genuine peace within the expected time as citizens are keen for the violence to stop. Despite IGAD weaknesses in the handling of the peace process, it is important to note that the primary responsibility to reach a sustainable peace agreement still rests with the conflict parties and the South Sudanese people. So far, little progress has been realized under the HLRF process as the probability of the peace talks collapsing looks the most likely scenario than signing a sustainable, inclusive and implementable agreement for the people.

Consequently, the US has called for comprehensive review of its policy in South Sudan because the political leaders' "demonstrated their inability and unwillingness to live up to their commitments to end the country's civil war"¹ according to the US Press Secretary. The United States also questioned the legitimacy and inclusivity of the current Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU)

¹ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-civil-war-south-sudan/>

without the participation of some key actors. United Kingdom² and Norway echoed the US position while reiterating the call for unified voice from the region to end the political impasse. The TROIKA further warn against unilateral decision to extend or organize elections but urge the government and opposition groups to take the HLRF process seriously as the only mechanism to restore legitimacy. Similar calls from the United Nations (UN) and the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) were received to push the HLRF process to deliver a lasting political solution that could lead the country to a new democratic dispensation.

Deplorably, the government's response to the statements was rather emotional and not well contextualized to acknowledge the frustrations of the TROIKA in the instability as well as partly accept its role in the stalemate so as to suggest solutions to the issues raised. The government reaction over-stepped any goodwill gesture of its old friends by calling the US as "subversive and obstructer of peace³" in South Sudan. Such phrases were uncalled for in a situation where the government needs to work hard to clean up its image and step up ways to reengage the international community to support its efforts to bring peace and stability to the country. But there is still hope for the government to fix things and salvage its friendship with the TROIKA. It should desist from taking a confrontational and defensive argument which could counter-productive and undermine the good relationship it has enjoyed with the TROIKA over the last years.

TROIKA FRUSTRATIONS AT CONTINUATION OF VIOLENCE

Since the failure of IGAD and guarantors (including TROIKA) of Agreement on resolution of the Conflict in Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) to find amenable solution to the 2016 internal crisis inside SPLM-IO and the J1 confrontations, the international community lost touch with the realities that confronted the post-2016 ARCSS implementation. As a result, the scale of violence that followed is despicable. Several declarations of cessation of hostilities were called by the parties and recently an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (ACOH) was signed at the end of 2017 under the HLRF process, but violence continues in most parts of the country unabated. This has to greater extend made the TROIKA to question the political will of leaders to end the conflict through negotiated agreement.

² <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ministerial-statement-on-the-peace-process-in-south-sudan>

³ Press Statement from the Office of the President. May 9, 2018

The ARCSS implementation scorecard justifies the TROIKA hesitations. According to JMEC Working Groups Reports⁴ (Governance, Security, Humanitarian, Transitional Justice and Resource, Economic Financial Management), none of the chapters of the ARCSS has been fully implemented, not even critical articles that are crucial for restoring peace and stability. Yet at the HLRF peace talks, the same disputes that made the ARCSS somewhat stuck are the sticking points that so far prevent any meaningful agreement to be reached. Some of these issues include; governance structure and composition, security sector reforms, number of states and system of governance. These disputes are not new; they are part of the root causes of the conflict as well as the core reasons for the failure of ARCSS to deliver its results.

Evidently, TROIKA are infuriated by the issues that they should have helped to resolved during the ARCSS implementation process in 2016. It is fair enough to say, the ARCSS peace guarantors including TROIKA were aware of these issues and had probably assisted in emboldening the parties' positions in the past by tackling them selectively during the post-2016 ARCSS implementation and at HLRF peace process. The IGAD and guarantors must take responsibility and bold decisions to resolve some of the controversial articles through sticking to other ARCSS articles and not subject them to negotiation as entry point to resolve some of the deadlocks. For example, on the issue of number of states and governance system, the 2015 agreement had clear provisions to address those matters head-on.

The recent statements released by the TROIKA undoubtedly signify the growing frustration, loss of trust and patience in the government. It is clear that the previously adored, well-nurtured and protected government that USA, UK and Norway worked so hard and invested so much to support, has all of sudden became a felon in their face. This new proposed US policy shift towards South Sudan should be a worrisome for every South Sudanese in and out of government – including the opposition groups who should not celebrate it. In the past, this is how US has changed its foreign policy towards African governments that has led to increased violence and untold suffering for the citizens. Some good examples include DR Congo in the 1960s to date, and recently Libya.

The consequences of US policy shift whether on the supporting the peace process or humanitarian assistance could affect those in dire need emergency aid and vulnerable citizens who are already exposed to so much pain and misery since the start of the civil war. For example, if US cuts its aid to South Sudan, most humanitarian interventions such as food distribution, health and water would be

⁴ JMEC Working Group Reports of Governance, Security, Humanitarian and Transitional Justice, September 2017

curtailed. Should US stop funding the peace process, what happens next? A perfect excuse by the parties to relax and declare lack of funds as excuse to the people. And at the end, the civil war could continue endlessly with all its negative effects. Such decisions benefit those in power more than citizens. The government and opposition groups should accept unconditional peace deal and engage the US constructively to support the post-conflict state-building programs.

POLICY OPTIONS FOR UNITED STATES

In light of the US decision to review its policy towards South Sudan, this section assesses the policy options that US could consider to influence the peace process in the short, medium and long term. It argues that US policy in South Sudan should prioritize critical areas that can significantly push for final end to this conflict, ensure the greater benefits to the people, punish the few elites and provide clear mechanisms to support post-conflict state-building.

- **Foreign aid cuts** – the United States remains the biggest contributor to humanitarian interventions in the country. According to data on Finance Tracking Service⁵ managed by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), since 2014, the US alone has spent \$2.048 billion in emergency interventions in South Sudan. This is more than 30% of the \$6.17 billion spent by all donors. Since the start of the conflict, significant quota of US funding was directed towards critical life-saving programs like food security, nutrition, health, education, water and civilian protection. Consequently, if there is budget cut on humanitarian assistance, this could likely affect the lives of nearly 7 million citizens who benefit from these interventions across the country. This should not really be an option for the US government under the current situation.
- **Arms embargo** – in February 2018, the United State imposed restrictions on arms sale to South Sudan⁶ to press the parties to compromise in the second phase of the HLRF peace talks. Although, this was symbolic gesture, it had yielded limited effect as the outcome of the HLRF talks could attest. In principle, if well enforced with wider support of the region, arms embargo could work in the South Sudan context. This is because the country is landlocked and economically cash-strapped to purchase arms through the black market which could prove expensive to sustain. An arms embargo that imposes extra sticks on neighbors that facilitate, procure or broker arms deal on behalf of the conflict parties in

⁵ <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/646/summary>

⁶ <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277849.htm>

South Sudan will contribute immensely in cutting-back the acquisition of ammunitions that could end the war. If parties have limited arms, the incentive for political settlement becomes admirable to them. Therefore, arms embargo proposal must go beyond just targeting South Sudan, but must have mechanisms to ensure that countries in the region to accept and enforce its implementation. At the meantime, this could be a strong and viable option but must have clear mechanisms for immediate lifting should parties sign genuine peace and stabilize the country so as to support professional development of the army.

- **Maintain engagement with government** – since 2013, TROIKA had reduced their engagement and technical support to the government on account of human rights violations resulting from the current conflict. This was to express their displeasure at the government approach in handling the conflict. This approach did not work as their direct influence on the conflict parties reduced. Instead it encouraged the government to seek new partnerships with the East (China and Russia) and Arab world for diplomatic and military support with less influence of the West. Perhaps, this explains the growing influence of these countries in the diplomatic arena. Consequently, if US, UK and Norway decide to maintain this limited engagement and communication, it would continue to have negative effect on the ongoing peace process as mistrust and suspicion would persist between the government and the TROIKA. A constructive engagement process is required to increase direct communication and influence during negotiation, implementation and post-conflict dispensation.
- **Pressure the region** – it is fair enough to say, the current stand-off at the HLRF peace process is largely contributed by third parties and not only the South Sudanese political leaders to some extent who look confused on what to do. Specifically, the rivalry of Egypt and Uganda⁷ on one side with Ethiopia⁸ and Sudan on another is proving costly to international efforts to find solution to the conflict. Luckily, the United States has strong leverage over these countries. The US is the biggest foreign budget contributor to Egypt and Uganda's military and other economic sectors. It can use such leverage to push these countries to exert pressure on their respective allies in South Sudan to accept political settlement of the conflict. As long as parties still enjoy diplomatic and military support from the regional allies, the incentives for peaceful solution becomes secondary to military solution. The TROIKA particularly US must make supporting military solution costly among

⁷ <https://messengerafrika.com/2017/01/16/south-sudan-war-gives-impetus-to-egypts-nile-basin-policy/>

⁸ <http://www.e-ir.info/2017/11/30/ethiopia-and-the-south-sudanese-civil-war/>

the regional players so that the effect could be felt far and wide. This policy option could have a quick and direct effect on the peace process if adopted by the United States.

- **Targeted sanctions** – South Sudan smelled its first sanctions in 2014⁹ when the United States imposed financial restrictions and travel bans on some key military commanders from the warring parties. This was followed by European Union and United Nations sanctions on several other individuals. But someone would argue since 2014, nothing has so far changed in terms of stopping the violence. Instead, the expansion and continuation of the civil war proved that these sanctions have not worked. The sanction regime adopted has not been enforced by the countries which hold significant weight on South Sudan's political and military leaders. What could happen if Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan decide to freeze accounts and impose travel bans on the war profiteers? It might take weeks or months for the effect to be felt by the perpetrators of violence and the enticement for war will erode almost immediately. Majority of the top military and political leaders of South Sudan have accounts, properties and families in these countries. As such, the United States could approach sanctions from this point of view for it to have serious consequences and motivate conflict parties to sign peace. Moreover, targeted sanctions must hit those at the highest level of command and decision-making structure but not the junior leaders who execute instructions.
- **Broader economic and trade sanctions** – another policy option could be for the US to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on South Sudan. Recently the US has listed fifteen companies¹⁰ which have direct involvement in the country's oil sector for restriction on procurement of petroleum technologies. This is insignificant sanction program because South Sudan oil sector is made up of crude oil export and no processing takes place and besides China is the leading investor in the sector. Evidence suggests, most of these companies are involved in brokering oil deals between the government and foreign oil firms and rarely engage in exploration or development of oil infrastructure. As a result, this sanction regime had limited effect but instead bolsters perpetrators to play the victim's game. On the other hand, a comprehensive economic sanction will hurt the poor more than the elites because it will directly affect individuals in conducting private financial transactions abroad (including remittances), limit trade and close the country entirely from

⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/world/africa/us-imposes-first-sanctions-in-south-sudan-conflict.html>

¹⁰ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-southsudan-oil-sanctions/u-s-targets-south-sudan-oil-firms-with-sanctions-to-choke-off-war-funds-idUSKBN1GX27N>

the only economic activity (oil and mining) which is the main source of government revenue. Opposition sympathizers may argue; this could help to stop revenue that is used to finance the war. There is no doubt that the oil and other minerals like gold have contributed enormously in sustaining this conflict. Nonetheless, any decision to impose broad economic and trade sanctions must be carefully weighed to avoid more economic shocks in already ailing economy that will put citizens' lives in greater misery. Moreover, evidence from other conflict prone countries like Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Somalia among others show that such policy led to increased black market trade in mineral that had caused more instability since black market economies often bred militias and warlords funded by cartels in Europe, Asia and the Americas. This could also cause greater regional insecurity and increase violence interminably.

- **Support peace initiatives** – the United States had supported the peace process since 2014 financially and technically. It funded the negotiations and implementation of the ARCSS through providing funds to key institutions established under the ARCSS including the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), the Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanisms (CTSAMM) among others. JMEC has had performance issues since its formation. The institutional weaknesses of JMEC have been in the public domain in the aftermath of the 2016 crisis where it was accused of delivering the expectations of the masses – full implementation of the ARCSS. Public opinions among citizens have widely faulted the institution for not doing enough if not to act but to name and shame violators of the ARCSS. This allegation is debatable depending on which political side one comes from. The US has indicated its decision to review the support to the ARCSS institutions. However, the problem is not stopping financial or technical support to JMEC or ARCSS bodies but the discussion or policy should focus on how to make these entities more effective to support the peace agreement implementation. The US needs to push for genuine reforms in JMEC and other ARCSS established institutions to make it effective and efficient. Suspending technical and financial support will aggravate already weak and inept bodies. Therefore, US support to the peace process should remain unconditional so that this conflict can be resolved politically.
- **Increase funding to civil society and the media** – the United States should reconsider its funding priorities in South Sudan to include allocation of more resources to support civil society and the media sector. South Sudan needs vibrant civil society and media to play the watchdog role during the peace negotiations, implementation and post-conflict democratic dispensation. Building the capacity of civil society and the media to support government in

policy development and advocacy is critical – this should not be preconditioned on full achievement of peace because it is a process that must be nurtured. Civil society plays important role in implementing grass-root dialogues and reconciliation that remains essential for sustainable peace in the country. During the ARCSS negotiations, the civil society played decisive role in lobbying and advocating for inclusive governance and reforms. But this momentum was quickly lost when parties signed the agreement. Perhaps, this partly explains why the ARCSS had not been widely disseminated to the citizens and turn-out to be elite peace deal. There was limited involvement of the civil society in the post-ARCSS negotiations period. This approach ought to be changed and the US should take the lead by providing additional technical and financial support to the civil society and the media to reach out to the population should the revitalized agreement be signed by the parties.

GOVERNMENT POLICY CHOICES

At the current state, the government of South Sudan has limited policy options to salvage its ailing foreign policy, economic conditions and brutal civil war. South Sudan is a state with sovereignty and territorial integrity like another United Nations member. But sovereignty comes with a responsibilities and obligations to protect citizens and their properties. The debate on sovereignty should focus on delivering peace, stability and economic prosperity for all citizens. In a century of global inter-dependency, nation-states have increasingly become weak and vulnerable to regional and global institutions such as the African Union and United Nations. Consequently, it is critical for the government to seek genuine amicable solutions to its internal problems before regional players intervene. The government still has the power as legitimate institution to review its current policies and make tough decisions to regain its place in the world as important regional trade and security partner. In this last section, the paper considers some of the policy options the government could pursue immediately and in the long-term.

- **Achieve peace and stability** – literally, the government most viable policy option must be to end the civil war and achieve peace, security and stability to regain trust and confidence of its traditional allies like United States. This policy should galvanize the ongoing peace process in Addis Ababa, the SPLM reunification and national dialogue to reach genuine and comprehensive settlement of social and political problems that face the people of South Sudan. For this to happen, the government has a constitutional mandate of protection and welfare of the people and should lead the way in conceding compromises that could lead to

a sustainable peace. On the other hand, the opposition groups should as well replicate this by tabling reasonable conditions to make negotiations easy, simple and achievable. This is the only safe route out of the current security, political and economic predicaments that led to the recent diplomatic row.

- **Observe the cessation of hostilities and ceasefires** – as parties continue to negotiate to find political solutions, it is critical for the government to observe its own ceasefire declarations and above all respect the cessation of hostilities agreement it signed with the opposition in December 2017. This does not mean the government cannot respond if attacked by opposition groups. There are clear indicators of activities that amount to violation that it could respect. For example, unnecessary movement of troops or patrols, deployments of machineries, recruitment, training and reconnaissance. Equally, if the government is cited in CTSAMM reports as violator of the cessation of hostilities or ceasefire does not help its diplomacy. Observing these basic requirements of the ACoH could show good gesture and interest to pursue political settlement. Therefore, a change in policy of non-confrontation and strict adherence to agreed commitments could help repair its public and international reputation as genuine peace partner.
- **Revamp, review and restructure its foreign policy** – since the onset of the civil war, the country's foreign policy has been mixed one characterized by inconsistent communication and deployment of politicians as envoys instead of career diplomats. It is time for the government to pursue a consistent and well-thought-out foreign policy that could assist in rebuilding faith and confidence in the country around the world. A country does not necessarily need many missions established abroad or hundreds of ambassadors to have good reputation. Peace, security and economic growth are strong ingredients of good and influential foreign policy. Most developed countries dictate global affairs because of their economic and security stability. Under the current economic and war conditions, still something could be done to improve strategic partnerships through deployment of competent envoys with consistent and well-crafted message coupled with achieving peace and stability. It is important for the government not lose its traditional friends who are essential development partners. The ongoing clean up in the foreign ministry should not focus on the personnel changes but holistic review of the foreign policy that would change the country's image.
- **Maintain consistency in communicating government position** – this is a low cost function that the government could implement with limited resources through investing in the right personnel and technology. Most countries have key spokespersons who maintain consistent

message being communicated – foreign affairs, government, defense and presidency. In crises prone setting like in South Sudan, these institutions must communicate issues with consistency. Foreign policy requires utmost diligence in messaging and delivery of the message. This is critical for the government. It helps to set standard and clarify misconceptions. Occasionally, the government of South Sudan has been castigated not for serious mistakes but for what it communicated out in the public. A deliberate attempt to review this approach will improve international perception of the country.

- **Avoid diplomatic confrontation** – since 2014, South Sudan and the TROIKA have not enjoyed cordial relationship. The government has rebuked the TROIKA in many occasions accusing them of being the masterminds of the political crisis. The recent statements of the US, UK and Norway and the government's response were clear signs of edgy relations. It is understandable why the government feels aggrieved, threatened and bullied by super powers. Equally, it is crucial for the government to recognize why the country's traditional friends are frustrated. Analyzing the statements from the TROIKA, the central point was parties should 'compromise for peaceful resolution'. Regardless of the threats and bully, it is judicious for the government to not take the confrontational and defensive attitude but rather ask to be listened to and be accorded support to find solution to the conflict. Confrontational engagement could only push away the government partners to rethink their support, a scenario that the country should fall into at all cost. The government needs strategic allies like the United States and Europe in the long-term. This conflict should not change this fact because South Sudan has unfinished business with its old foe Sudan.
- **Repair relationship with the United Nations** – another critical element of policy shift within the government could be reassessment of its engagement and relationship with the United Nations (UN), particularly, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Since 2014, the government has lost trust and faith in UNMISS as development partner despite this mission could likely stay for another 10-20 years. This ought to change in the short and medium term for the government's advantage. Therefore, having cordial and mutual understanding with UNMISS could help the country tremendously in cleansing its image at the international stage. It is in the best interest of the government to bring the top UN agencies in the country to its side.
- **Implement the ARCISS in totality** – the ARCISS implementation faced stern criticisms for its inability to realize fundamental reforms in the governance, security and economic sectors. Since mid-2016, its legality and inclusivity has been questioned as well. As the tenure of the deal comes to an end in May or August 2018, its mandate and legality of institutions

established under it has become an issue of public debate. A political decision backed with concrete actions to implement critical articles in the agreement by the current Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) could help the government to show seriousness and renewed political will to bring peace and stability. For example, full implementation of chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 in totality would prove decisive new policy shift that could greatly favor the government.

- **Open space for civil society and the media** – another face-lifting policy change for the TGoNU is to revise its existing strategy on the role of civil society and the media. Civil society and media are sensitive governance watchdogs that could benefit government to rebuild its image or deprive it of international partners' support and sympathy if cracked down. Reducing space for these sectors does not help show good government intentions. There are adequate legal instruments that government could use to regulate the work of the civil society and media without causing it serious damage. Though, the existing laws have serious loopholes and had been criticized, it is possible to make bad laws into good in practice.

CONCLUSION

The government of South Sudan must reach genuine and sustainable peace deal as a matter of urgency. This policy should top the government priority in action, spirit and words. The TROIKA are concerned for the lack of political will to bring peace as such, the government needs to acknowledge this protest from its friends. The events that unfolded since 2013 should not change the fact that South Sudan is more than a partner or friend to the United States, United Kingdom and Norway. The country has still a long way to establish itself in the community of nations and it will take technical, moral, diplomatic, military and financial support from these countries to get itself up and running. Currently, the country's relationship with its traditional partners is at its all-time low since 1983. This should not be the case. Although, new friends who were actually the country's proxy enemies during the 21 years of struggle have become highly respected allies, the government should not throw away those who stood and supported them during the dark days. South Sudan still needs her old friends for the unforeseeable future to support its nation-building. The best gift the government could offer to regain trust and confidence of the people and its friends is to bring back peace, stability and economic prosperity so that the citizens could work to establish for the next generation a country they will be proud to call home.

Though, the TROIKA are justified in their displeasure with the government under the current political and security crises, they still need to recommit their engagement and support to the government

technically, morally and financially to bring peace and stability to South Sudan. They should focus on developing mutual trust, understanding and respect for each other's dissatisfaction as mechanism to resolve the conflict. Funding humanitarian interventions a global moral obligation of solidarity to avert human catastrophe. This should be the basis for consideration when reviewing foreign aid to the country. As the civil war continues unabated, it is the time the people of South Sudan need their traditional friends more than ever. Therefore, the citizens deserve the support of TROIKA regardless of their leaders' mistakes and political failure to bring peace and stability.

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the government, private sector and civil society to work together to fast-track development in South Sudan.

About the Author

Malish John Peter is a Public Policy Analyst with over 10 years of work experience with various NGOs in South Sudan. He has worked in various programs cutting-across governance, civil society, education, health, community development and micro-enterprise development. He holds Masters of Arts in Public Policy from University of Nottingham, United Kingdom, Bachelor of Business Administration from Nkumba University, Uganda and Diploma in Social Works and Social Administration from the Institute of Management Studies, Uganda. Currently, Malish is the Chief Executive Officer of the ISPR and Consultant of the Civil Society Facility Project in South Sudan. He can be reached on mjmalish487@googlemail.com



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